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Life as We Know It: The Expansion of the 
Right to Life Under the Jurisprudence of  
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ALEXANDRA R. HARRINGTON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The idea of protecting life1 within the context of human rights law 
is perhaps elemental since, as the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has explained on numerous occasions, without protecting life all 
other human rights protections are meaningless.2  Indeed, a survey of 
international and regional human rights treaties and conventions 
demonstrates the uniformity of inclusion of the right to life, as a 
guaranteed right, across divergent state parties and instrument-
promulgation goals.  
And yet, the terms of the right to life and the construction of its 
meaning do vary between instruments. For example, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights simply states that “[e]very 
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected 
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”3 By 
comparison, the European Convention on Human Rights states that 
“[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a 
sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this 
penalty is provided by law.”4 Finally, the American Convention on 
Human Rights states that “[e]very person has the right to have his life 
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the 
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”5 
Of course, the meaning of these provisions depends not only on a plain 
text reading but also on the construction of these provisions by the 
appropriate international or regional body.  
                                                                    
 
 1. For the purposes of this article, the right to life is defined as extending to and protecting 
individuals from birth onward. The article does not intend to take a position as to the applicability 
of the right to life under the American Convention on Human Rights to the unborn.  
 2. Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 165 (July 4, 2007). 
 3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), opened for signature Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 4. European Court of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights art. 62(1), 
opened up for signature 1950 (entered into force on June 1, 2010). 
 5. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser4v/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975). 
 
314  Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:313 
 
 
 
 
This article focuses on the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s 
(“Court”) creation of a body of jurisprudence regarding the right to life 
that has expanded and become increasingly nuanced throughout the 
Court’s history. The Court is selected for analysis because, as the Court 
itself admits, it is at the forefront of developing human rights law.6 In 
addition, the Court offers a strong example of how the right to life can 
be used by a juridical body to reflect the many facets of life and to 
holistically incorporate these facets into jurisprudence protecting life for 
individuals and communities. Expanding the Court’s construction of the 
right to life illustrates that the contours of life as we know it have 
changed–and will change–to ensure that they reflect and protect the 
intricate tapestry of human rights that are encompassed by the right to 
life. 
Part II of this article provides background on the Inter-American 
human rights system, its foundational texts, and the institutional bodies 
that are charged with protecting human rights throughout the region. 
Part III then examines the right to life in the Court’s jurisprudence by 
focusing on three main areas: 1) the textual right to life; 2) the 
protective construction of the right to life; and 3) the right to life and 
remedies. The section on the textual right to life discusses the essential 
elements of the right to life as established by the American Convention 
on Human Rights (“American Convention”). The section on the 
protective construction of the right to life asserts that the Court has used 
the right to life as a protective mechanism to expand the boundaries of 
more traditional constructs of the right. In particular, the Court 
identified vulnerable groups suffering from extreme violations of the 
right to life and treated these violations as the parameters of the right. 
Within the protective construction of the right to life are five sub-
sections: 1) victims of forced disappearances; 2) victims of extra-
judicial killings; 3) children as victims; 4) indigenous communities as 
victims; and 5) prison inmates as victims.  
In Part IV, the article examines trends in the Court’s shaping of the 
right to life and the state of the right to life as we currently know it in 
the Inter-American human rights system. Part IV also examines the 
potential impact of cases currently pending before the Court on future 
construction of the right to life. Ultimately, this article concludes with 
the observation that the Court’s expansion of the right to life is essential 
for maintaining the Inter-American human rights system as a vibrant 
mechanism of jurisprudence on human rights. 
                                                                    
 
 6. Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 232 (Aug. 31, 2011). 
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II.  INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM BACKGROUND 
In order to understand and chart the development of the right to 
life in the Inter-American context, it is essential to first understand the 
Inter-American human rights system itself. The Inter-American human 
rights system is a creation of the Organization of American States 
(“OAS”). As one of the oldest regional organizations in the world, the 
OAS has established a deeply entrenched connection between its 
members despite the political and societal tensions that often flare 
between them.7 Given the strength of this relationship, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the OAS has created law and policy in a number of 
areas, ranging from human rights to the security of the environment.8  
One of the bedrock documents for the OAS is the American 
Convention, often referred to as the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica. This 
convention established the Inter-American human rights system as it 
currently exists.9 Although the members of the OAS made an earlier 
human rights statement in the American Declaration on Human 
Rights,10 the American Convention codified the principles in the 
American Declaration as a matter of law for State parties.11 In addition 
to making these rights and duties legally binding on State parties, the 
American Convention established the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“Commission”) and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights as a bi-level system for addressing individual complaints 
regarding the human rights practices of State parties.12  
Under this system, the first institution to which an individual may 
complain is the Commission.13 The complaint, which may be brought by 
the affected individual, his representative, a human rights group, or an 
affected community, must first pass an admissibility test.14 The 
admissibility test requires that the complainant exhaust his remedies at 
the domestic level,15 unless this is impossible or would result in a severe 
threat to the complainant.16 Second, the complainant or the person who 
                                                                    
 
 7. Who We Are, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, available at 
http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 8. Id. 
  9. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5. 
 10. O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, 
Mar. 30–May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser. L./ V/II.23/doc. 2 rev. 6 (English 1979). 
 11. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5. 
 12. Id. chs. VI–VIII. 
 13. Id. ch. VII. 
 14. Id. art. 44. 
 15. Id. art. 46. 
 16. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser4v/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975). 
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has suffered the harm must be a citizen of a state that has both ratified 
the American Convention and agreed to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission and of the Court.17 Third, the alleged human rights abuse 
must be justiciable under the American Convention.18 Fourth, the 
complaint must not be pending before another international human 
rights body.19 Finally, the allegation must not be frivolous.20  If these 
hurdles are not met, the complaint will be dismissed.21 If they are met, 
the complaint investigation will continue and the state party will have 
the ability to provide the Commission with information regarding the 
subject of the complaint.22  
The Commission will typically issue recommendations to the 
involved state party regarding the steps necessary to address or 
otherwise remedy the complained of situation.23 In this way, the 
Commission has a dual role as investigative entity and the source of 
some remedial authority, although this authority does not carry the same 
gravity as the Court.24 The Commission also has the ability to refer a 
complaint to the Court. The Court may issue a judicial decision on the 
existence of a potential violation, or it may decide the appropriate 
reparations owed to the victim(s) of human rights violations.25 At this 
level, the Commission will be involved in the judicial proceedings, as 
will the State party and the individual complainants if they wish.26  
The Court is tasked with evaluating the evidence presented and 
deciding whether a violation of the American Convention occurred.27 
Beyond this decision, the Court also has the ability to craft pecuniary 
and, increasingly, non-pecuniary remedies and awards for the victims, 
their families, and their communities.28 As discussed below, the Court, 
through its decisions, has expanded the scope of the rights contained in 
the American Convention in order to craft a system that provides greater 
protections for individuals and communities as a whole.29  
                                                                    
 
 17. Id. art. 44. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. art. 46. 
 20. Id. art. 47. 
 21. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser4v/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975). 
 22. Id. art. 48. 
 23. Id. arts. 48, 51. 
 24. Id. arts. 48–51.  
 25. Id. art. 48. 
 26. Functions and Powers, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/functions.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 27. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note, at art. 63. 
 28. Id. art. 63. 
 29. For an in-depth discussion of these remedies see Alexandra R. Harrington, 
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The Court has also become increasingly adept at crafting holistic 
remedies, such as the erection of statues in honor of victims and 
ordering State parties to make public statements of responsibility for 
human rights violations. These remedies address not only the financial 
loss involved in human rights violations, but also the larger need for 
society to be made aware of these violations and to come to terms with 
them as part of the healing process.30 This has been especially important 
in cases of forced disappearances where the victim’s family and 
community are typically unable to receive an answer as to the 
whereabouts and fate of the victim. Forced disappearances are a way of 
hiding human rights violations from the community and instilling fear at 
the same time.31 
Before continuing on to any further analysis it must be noted that 
the decisions of the Court are not binding. In contrast to decisions of 
domestic courts, they cannot automatically be enforced against the State 
party in the domestic realm.32 However, the Court’s decisions hold a 
great deal of weight at the international and domestic level and have 
resulted in many important changes to domestic law and human rights 
practices.33 In addition, the Court’s decisions and findings are important 
sources of validation and identity for the many marginalized groups, 
such as indigenous communities and incarcerated children, which have 
brought successful claims before the Court.34 
III.  THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN THE INTER-AMERICAN  
COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE 
Throughout its jurisprudential history, the Court has used multiple 
visions of the right to life in order to weave an expansive and 
meaningful application of the right. In order to understand this 
jurisprudence, this Part is broken into three sections: 1) the textual right 
to life; 2) the protective construction of the right to life; and 3) the right 
to life and remedies–so that the full application and construction of the 
right to life can be appreciated.  
A.  The Textual Right to Life 
The American Convention articulates the right to life as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Institutionalizing Human Rights in Latin America: The Role of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights System, TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. (forthcoming). 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. American Convention on Human Rights art. 62(3), supra note 5. 
 33. See Harrington, Institutionalizing Human Rights in Latin America, supra note 29. 
 34. See id.  
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1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This  
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the  
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived  
of his life.35 
The remainder of the right to life provision in the American 
Convention specifically targets the death penalty, focusing on the 
conditions surrounding its use, with the ultimate goal of abolishing the 
death penalty within State penal systems.36 While this is certainly an 
important issue at the domestic and international level, the focus of this 
article is solely on section 1 of the right to life provision since the Court 
has steadily expanded it. 
Facially, the terms of the right to life are rather nebulous. The right 
can be construed very narrowly to apply solely in the criminal context, 
or it can be construed more broadly to protect the right to life in a 
societal context.37 It is within the latter context that the Court has 
expanded the right to life, and the understanding of what life is, in order 
to protect individuals and communities as well as to protect the sanctity 
of life as holistic concept. 
B.  Protective Construction of the Right to Life 
 As a threshold matter, the Court has consistently found that acts 
such as the imposition of the death penalty and certain human rights 
abuses that occur in the accepted penal law context are violations of the 
right to life.38 In this sense, the Court has endorsed and upheld the 
standard way in which many courts, particularly human rights courts, 
apply the right to life.39  
However, early in its jurisprudence the Court went beyond this 
traditional construction and began to expand the right beyond the 
criminal context.40 Perhaps the most important explanation of the right 
                                                                    
 
 35. American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), supra note 5. 
 36. See generally id. art. 4. 
 37. See generally id. 
 38. See Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (June 21, 2002); Fermin 
Ramirez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
126 (June 20, 2005); Raxcacó-Reyes v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 133 (Sept. 15, 2005); Boyce et al. v. Barbados, Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169 (Nov. 
20, 2007); Dacosta-Cadogan v. Barbados, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 204 (Sept. 24, 2009). 
 39. See id.  
 40. See Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101 (Nov. 25, 2003); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
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to life in the Inter-American human rights system was offered by the 
Court in the Mack Chang case,41 in which it explained that “the right to 
life plays a fundamental role in the American Convention because it is a 
prior condition for the realization of the other rights. When the right to 
life is not respected, all other rights lack meaning.”42 This revolutionary 
pronouncement allowed the Court to significantly expand the place of 
the right to life within its jurisprudence and within the construct of the 
Inter-American human rights system as a whole.  
 As a corollary, the Court has created both positive and negative 
State responsibilities in terms of implementing and upholding the right 
to life within the domestic context. Specifically, the Court has explained 
that the right to life requires not only that no person be arbitrarily 
deprived of her life (negative obligation), but also that the States adopt 
all appropriate measures to protect and preserve the right to life 
(positive obligation), under their duty to ensure full and free exercise of 
the rights by all persons under their jurisdiction.43  
The duality of the right to life has become essential to the Court in 
its analysis of cases involving the right to life throughout a wide range 
of policy areas. Overall, the idea of the right to life as the cornerstone of 
human rights protections has translated into several particular policy 
areas that address the vulnerable and societally marginalized—
particularly the below-discussed groups.  
1.  Victims of Forced Disappearances 
Throughout the history of the Court and its jurisprudence, the 
practice of forced disappearances was, and continues to be, 
systematically used by many State parties as a way to silence political, 
social or other dissent;44 target and harm certain, particularly vulnerable, 
groups;45 stamp out political insurrections and perceived disloyalty to 
the governing regime;46 and generally intimidate the larger community 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005). 
 41. See Myrna Mack-Chang, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 101, supra note 40, at 92. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 92–93.  
 44. See, e.g., La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 162 (Nov. 29, 2006); Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 232 (Aug. 31, 2011).  
 45. See, e.g., Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212 (May 25, 2010); Escué-Zapata v. 
Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165 (July 4, 
2007).   
 46. See, e.g., Ibsen-Cárdenas and Ibsen-Peña v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 217 (Sept. 1, 2010); Gomes-Lund et al. (Guerrilha de 
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from which the person was disappeared.47 The hallmarks of forced 
disappearances are uncertainty as to: the location of the person 
disappeared, whether the person is still alive, and whether the person 
has been or is being subjected to torture.48  
These elements of forced disappearances are certainly damaging to 
the victim, but they also have direct and devastating effects on the 
victim’s family and community.49 More than conjecture or supposition, 
the Court uses the familial, community-based damages and negative 
impacts of forced disappearances to justify the imposition of non-
pecuniary remedies. These remedies include physical and mental health 
services for family members scarred by the disappearance,50 and 
educational opportunities for family members forced to leave school as 
a result of economic and physical hardship after the victim was 
disappeared.51 Additionally, the Court has noted the direct and 
stigmatizing impact on indigenous communities, where members—
particularly leaders or activists connected to them—have been 
disappeared, because of the overall vulnerability of these communities 
in law and society.52 Thus, in addition to the victim himself, forced 
disappearances impact the family of the victim and the community in 
which the victim lived.53   
Given the reality of the impact of forced disappearances, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the Court has regularly found the practice 
itself to constitute a violation of the victim’s right to life. More than 
that, however, the Court has extended the relationship between forced 
disappearances and the right to life, holding that the right does not end 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Araguaia) v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219 (Nov. 24, 2010); González-Medina and relatives v. Dominican 
Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 240 (Feb. 27, 2012).  
 47. See, e.g., 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109 (July 5, 2004).  
 48. See, e.g., id.; La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162 (Nov. 29, 2006); Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165 (July 4, 2007); Contreras et al. v. El 
Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 232 (Aug. 
31, 2011); Chitay Nech, supra note 45; Ibsen-Cárdenas and Ibsen-Peña v. Bolivia, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, supra note 45; Gomes-Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 219 (Nov. 24, 2010); González-Medina and Relatives v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, supra note 46. 
 49. Harrington, supra note 29, at 15. 
 50. Id. at 23–24, 28–29. 
 51. Id. at 26. 
 52. Id. at 17. 
 53. See id.  
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with the death of the disappeared individual victim.54  For example, the 
Court has established that practices such as hiding the bodies of those 
who have been disappeared and then killed to constitute a violation of 
the right to life. This is especially so where hiding involved 
dismemberment and burial with the purpose of ensuring that the family 
could not find the victim.55  
As a corollary to this, the Court has ordered that the bodies of the 
disappeared be exhumed by the State and returned to their families 
based on the finding that secreting bodies away was part of the ongoing 
violation of the right to life.56 In this situation, it was not sufficient for 
the State to admit that the disappeared victim had been killed in order to 
attempt a remedy of the violation.57 Instead, the State was required to 
physically return the remains to the family for proper burial, thereby 
expanding the right to life to include the honoring of the extinguished 
life with dignity in death.58  
 A good example of this is the Cotton Field case from the area of 
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.59 In that case, there was an established pattern 
of violence against women and girls and a persistent failure to 
investigate or to prevent this type of violence.60 The police and 
prosecution within the Ciudad Juarez area acted—or failed to act—in a 
way which allowed the victims to suffer sexual violence, torture and 
death while they were disappeared.61 In essence, the Court found that 
the State authorities fostered a culture of impunity for acts of violence 
against women and girls that caused the victims to suffer a violation of 
their right to life.  
Once a deceased victim’s remains were found, the investigation 
system in use in Ciudad Juarez failed the victims and their families. The 
Court took particular exception to the practice of State actors impugning 
the victims and threatening their families in order to convince them not 
to pursue the case further.62 These actions amounted to a continuing 
violation of the right to life that began with the disappearance of the 
                                                                    
 
 54. 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra note 47, ¶¶ 154–56. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 90 (Dec. 
6, 2001); Ibsen-Cárdenas and Ibsen-Peña v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra note 
45, at ¶ 242. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).  
 60. See generally id. 
 61. See id.  
 62. See id. 
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victims.63 Further, the Court asserted that the failure of the State to 
ensure a vigorous prosecution of those alleged to be responsible was 
also violation of the victim’s right to life.64  
The Court’s handling of forced disappearance within the frame of 
the right to life can be seen as asserting that respect for the right to life 
is an inferential part of the right itself. The Court’s jurisprudence also 
evidences that respect for the right to life continues to exist and be 
justiciable even after the victim has perished. This link is also supported 
throughout the development of the Court’s jurisprudence in other areas. 
It affirms the assertion that the Court has evolved an understanding of 
life as we know it that is far more holistic than a facial reading of the 
American Convention might suggest. 
Recent cases decided by the Court have established a near 
presumption of state actor or quasi-state actor involvement in forced 
disappearances. These cases provide detailed descriptions of the 
regimes under which the alleged disappearances occurred, such as in 
Bolivia,65 the Dominican Republic,66 El Salvador67 and Uruguay.68 
Forced disappearances were a typical state practice and these cases 
provide detailed descriptions of the forms of torture used on those who 
were disappeared and held in secret confinement by the particular 
regime.69 
2.  Victims of Extra-judicial Killings 
In the context of Court jurisprudence, the term “extra-judicial 
killing” refers to the process of state actors (or imputed/quasi-state 
actors) killing individuals without a trial or other hallmarks of 
legitimate judicial process, regardless of whether judicially sanctioned 
imposition of the death penalty is legally permitted in the state in 
question.70 Extra-judicial killings have often been, and continue to be, 
used to target or send a message to a particular group, community, or 
constituency.71 In many instances, however, they have been carried out 
                                                                    
 
 63. See id. ¶ 388. 
 64. See González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).  
 65. See Ibsen-Cardenas and Ibsen Pena, supra note 46, ¶¶ 50–56. 
 66. See Gonzalez-Medina, supra note 46, ¶¶ 137–44. 
 67. See Contreras, supra note 44, ¶¶ 40–55. 
 68. See Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
221, ¶ 388 (Feb. 24, 2011).  
 69. See Ibsen-Cardenas and Ibsen Pena, supra note 46, ¶ 54. 
 70. See id. ¶¶ 49–56; Gonzalez-Medina, supra note 46, ¶¶ 139–44; Contreras, supra note 44, 
¶¶ 40–55; Gelman, supra note 68, ¶¶ 44–63. 
 71. Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 11, ¶¶ 
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randomly and arbitrarily.72 The victims of these killings range from 
those who seemingly did nothing wrong other than be in a particular 
place at a particular time, to human rights campaigners or indigenous 
community leaders because of the state perception that they constituted 
a threat to its established order.73 What all these victims have in 
common is that they were killed as a result of some form of concerted 
action on the part of the state or state sponsored actors. 
As with forced disappearances, the Court, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
has found that the act of extra-judicial killing is a violation of the right 
to life.74 There are three primary phases at which the violation of the 
right to life occurs in the context of extra-judicial killings. The first 
phase is in the planning of the killing; for example, stalking the victim, 
or determining the areas in which the victim or members of a targeted 
group might be vulnerable.75 The second phase is the actual act of 
killing the victim, regardless of the method or manner used for this 
purpose.76 Thus, both the killing of a disappeared person and the killing 
of a targeted person in broad daylight would fall into this phase.  And 
the third phase—following the death of the victim, is the act of covering 
up the state’s involvement in the death.77 This phase can involve any 
number of state actors or quasi-state actors who planned the killing as 
part of an overarching attempt to silence a particular victim, as in the 
Myrna Mack Chang case.78 As with the Court’s construction of 
violations of the right to life in the context of forced disappearances, 
this phase extends beyond the death of the victim and emphasizes 
respect for the victim post-mortem79.  
In the context of extra-judicial killings, the Court has established 
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that the ultimate responsibility for the preservation of the right to life 
lies with the State and all of its actors, including police forces, military 
groups, and para-military groups where appropriate.80 The Court has 
concomitantly asserted that States are required to extend the terms of 
their criminal laws to these actors and agents in order to stop the 
potential for impunity.81 
 Further, the Court has been highly critical of police investigatory 
practices when extra-judicial killings have been committed. The Court 
noted that these practices often involve shoddy forensic investigatory 
standards and a failure to properly document the type and nature of the 
abuses committed against the victims prior to and including the fatal 
act. 82 These investigatory failures—whether the result of a cover-up or 
lack of resources—constitute an additional element of the violation of 
the victim’s right to life even though the violations occurred post-
mortem.83  
3.  Children as Victims 
 Children are an extremely vulnerable group within the Inter-
American human rights system, regardless of where they live.84  This is 
especially true given that many children in this region are quite poor, do 
not live in a regular familial setting, live on the margins of societal 
acceptance and inclusion, and thus are unable to avail themselves of 
social or legal protections even where they do exist.85 Indeed, even in 
instances where children and young adults live with their families, the 
families are often unable to protect the lives of these children unless 
they pay bribes or offer other inducements to state actors, especially in 
the juvenile detention setting.86 
The Court has dealt with several cases involving children during 
the course of its jurisprudence. In these cases, the Court has consistently 
found that States have a greater obligation to respect children’s right to 
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life due to the quintessential vulnerabilities of childhood and to the 
existence of international protections for children, such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which nearly all state parties 
have signed onto as a matter of law.87  
Although the Court’s jurisprudence related to children is not as 
copious as that relating to forced disappearances and extra-judicial 
killings, it is essential to understanding the growth of right to life in the 
Inter-American context. Children, as vulnerable and marginalized 
members of society, must be given protections and allowed to live 
unharmed within society. Protections must include not only the state 
protecting children from society as a whole but also the state protecting 
children from the state itself. This relates to the expansion of the right to 
life to include respect for life as well as protection of life in the criminal 
context. Understanding this distinction is critical to the next section of 
this Part addressing indigenous communities. Respect for life is at the 
heart of most issues relating to these communities, which are typically 
marginalized within the mainstream of law and society and, thus, often 
viewed as less important members of the state community. 
An interesting sub-set of the rights of children in the Court’s right 
to life jurisprudence is typified by the Gelman v Uruguay case.88 In that 
case, a young married couple was disappeared by the regime in 
Uruguay while Mrs. Gelman was in the later stages of pregnancy.89 
After she delivered a baby girl, the baby was adopted out to members of 
the regime.90 Following the birth, Mrs. Gelman’s fate became a mystery, 
while it was established that Mr. Gelman died.91 Many years later, the 
baby’s paternal grandfather located her and was able to confirm her real 
identity.92 Ms. Gelman and her paternal grandfather brought a complaint 
that ultimately reached the Court, alleging several violations of the 
American Convention including the violation of Mrs. Gelman’s right to 
life.93 The Court agreed with Ms. Gelman, finding that there had been a 
violation of her mother’s right to life and also confirmed the State’s 
pattern of abducting children from their “subversive” parents as a 
recognized state practice.94   
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The Court’s decision in Gelman was an important step for 
abducted children towards international recognition of violations of the 
right to life suffered by their parents. These children are being given a 
voice with which to indict the regime that destroyed their families.  
Conversely, Contreras et al. v. El Salvador addressed claims 
brought by parents and family members of children who were 
disappeared in a concerted campaign of abductions of the children of 
subversives in El Salvador between 1981 and1983.95 At the time of the 
case, one of these children had been found alive and the rest were still 
disappeared.96 The Court found that this violated the children’s right to 
life due to the stated assumption that those who were long disappeared 
were dead.97 Further, in Contreras, the Court explicitly stated that, while 
all forced disappearances created a situation of vulnerability in which 
the right to life could be implicated,  
[t]his situation is accentuated in the presence of a systematic 
pattern of human rights violations and when children are 
involved, as in this case, given that the illegal removal of their 
biological parents also jeopardizes the life, survival and 
development of the children, the latter understood in its 
broadest sense to include its physical, mental, spiritual, moral, 
psychological, and social aspects.98  
4.  Indigenous Communities 
 Indigenous communities have suffered many human rights 
violations in the OAS region as a matter of historical and modern day 
practice.99  The cases brought to the Court on behalf of these 
communities have tended to focus on issues involving the targeting of 
the indigenous community’s land and resources for development by the 
State, without the meaningful input or consent of the community 
itself;100 the failure of the State to provide basic services, such as access 
to health care to members of the community;101 and the targeting of 
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entire communities, or those advocating for the community, for either 
their claimed political affiliations or simply for their indigenous 
status.102 In all of these scenarios, the Court has found the right to life to 
be implicated. This is perhaps not surprising in the context of 
jurisprudence regarding violence against members of indigenous 
communities. However, the Court’s extension of the right to life into 
these other areas is groundbreaking and noteworthy in the discussion of 
the overall parameters of the right to life.  
In the Yakye Axa Community case, the Court established that the 
right to life “encompasses not only the right of every human being not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life but also the right not to be 
denied the conditions required to ensure a decent existence.”103 This 
concept of a “decent existence” is deeply connected to the idea of 
dignity on behalf of the individual and the community, and requires the 
State to ensure that conditions exist in which dignity is protected, 
preserved, and promoted.104 Dignity, as a subset of the right to life, is 
broadly applicable and the Court is adamant that it applies to indigenous 
communities and community members regardless of their social status, 
economic status, or isolation from the larger national community.105  
The Court also places the burden on the State to take “positive, 
concrete measures geared towards fulfillment of the right to a decent 
life for indigenous communities—especially in the case of persons who 
are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a high priority within 
the understanding of the right to life and what it entails.”106 The Yakye 
Axa Community case and its holdings were revolutionary in that they 
mark the first time that the Court explained the right to life in such an 
expansive way, extending well beyond the scope of protection from 
violent state action. 107  
Further, in Yakye Axa Community, the Court explicitly linked the 
right to life with the right to health, the right to food, and the right to 
access clean water.108  All of these rights are implicated in the idea of 
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the right to a decent living.109 The Court also linked these rights to the 
right to cultural identity and education, especially for indigenous 
communities that derive so much of their identity from cultural 
practices and beliefs.110  
The Yakye Axa Community case was followed by other cases 
involving indigenous communities that have endorsed and furthered the 
Court’s ruling and expanded the contours of the right to life even 
further.  In Sawhoyamaxa Community, for example, the Court 
unequivocally stated that: 
the states must adopt any measures that may be necessary to 
create an adequate statutory framework to discourage any 
threat to the right to life; to establish an effective system of 
administration of justice able to investigate, punish and repair 
any deprivation of lives by state agents, or by individuals; and 
to protect the right of not being prevented from access to 
conditions that may guarantee a decent life, which entails the 
adoption of positive measures to prevent the breach of such 
right.111  
The Sawhoyamaxa Court went on to add those who have been 
excluded from society in general and those who are extremely poor to 
the list of those who require special assistance ensuring that their right 
to life is respected by the national community and the State at large.112  
Despite these protections, the Court has been reluctant to hold the 
State responsible for violations of the right to life in instances where 
members of an indigenous community have died due to the inability to 
access health care, food, and clean water without a significant causal 
connection.113 In these instances, the Court reasoned that it was 
impossible to establish whether the deaths of these community members 
were the direct result of State inaction.114  
There are, however, some exceptions to this reasoning. In 
Sawhoyamaxa Community, for example, the Court found that conditions 
in the community were so egregious that the State should have foreseen 
that some community members would die as a result.115 In order to 
evaluate whether deprivations of these components of the right to life 
are sufficiently deplorable, the Court has established a state actor 
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foreseeability and knowledge requirement.116 This entails the state party 
having reasonable knowledge of the situation giving rise to the potential 
violation—such as the provision of insufficient water resources to 
sustain the community—and it being foreseeable that this situation 
would result in conditions that amount to a violation of the right to 
life.117 The Court’s rationale for developing this standard was to ensure 
that an onerous burden was not placed on the State such that it would be 
responsible for every loss of life, while at the same time ensuring that 
States acted in a way in compliance with the essential aspects of the 
right to life for all members of society, especially those identified as 
vulnerable.118 
 Later, the Court would go further in Xakmok Kasek Community by 
explaining that it would evaluate the claims brought by the Xakmok 
Kasek Community against the State of Paraguay using a standard that 
balanced the ways in which the State sought to protect the Xakmok 
Kasek Community against the State’s “duty to guarantee the right to life 
of the members of the Xákmok Kásek Community.”119 This 
determination focused on two sub-categories of the right to life—the 
right to a dignified existence, and the State’s international responsibility 
for the social situation, which the Xakmok Kasek Community alleged 
caused its members' deaths.120  
In order to make a determination as to the right to a dignified 
existence, the Court looked at the ability of the Xakmok Kasek 
Community to access water and the quality of the water itself,121 its 
access to food—including the nutritional quality and quantity of food 
provided by the State,122 its access to permanent healthcare services,123 
and its access to education in appropriate educational facilities.124 
Overall, the Court agreed with Xakmok Kasek Community members 
who stated that, in light of their state-dependent existence due to their 
disassociation from their traditional lands, Paraguay had not guaranteed 
the right to a dignified existence as part of the right to life under the 
American Convention.125  
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In order to determine State responsibility for the deaths of Xakmok 
Kasek Community members, the Court observed that the decision 
would be made on a historical basis.126  Current measures taken by the 
State would not, on their own, be sufficient to avoid responsibility for 
violations of the right to life.127 State culpability for deaths of Xakmok 
Kasek Community members would stem from a perspective that allows 
for the consideration of factors such as 1) the situation of extreme and 
particular vulnerability within the community and for the victims, 2) the 
cause of death of the victims, and 3) the corresponding causal link 
between them to be connected, without placing on the State the undue 
burden of overcoming an indeterminate or unknown risk.128   
The Court then analyzed the deaths that the Xakmok Kasek 
Community claimed were attributable to the State’s violation of the 
right to life. It found that these violations did in fact occur with regard 
to medical care provided to ill members of the Xakmok Kasek 
Community, mainly infants and children.129 What is particularly notable 
is that the Court went beyond the idea of general rights to food, water 
and health and included access to food, access to acceptable quality 
water, and access to health services as part of the right to a dignified 
existence.130 
However, it should be noted that where the indigenous 
community’s primary right to life claims are based on the deprivation of 
property rights, rather than the deprivation of resources, the Court has 
been reluctant to find violations of the right to life per se.131 Instead, the 
Court has historically relied on the property rights protections of the 
American Convention to find the State in violation and attempted to 
craft meaningful remedies for the affected indigenous communities.132 
While the Xakmok Kasek Community case is of interest for many 
reasons, it is important to developing an understanding of the right to 
life because it illustrates how the Court extended the parameters of the 
right to life while also ensuring that States are not categorically imputed 
with knowledge—and therefore responsibility—without evidence of a 
causal relationship. 
The Court’s latest decision involving indigenous communities, 
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Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, featured arguments 
that the Stategenerally violated the right to life of the Pueblo Indigena 
Kichwa de Sarayaku by allowing explosives to be used as part of the 
land-clearing phase of a contested oil exploration project, and noted 
several specific instances of deaths allegedly due to these measures.133 
However, the Court again attempted to temper the parameters of its 
positive right to life jurisdiction by reiterating that the provision should 
be made 
“when the authorities knew or should have known about the 
existence of a situation of real and immediate risk to the life 
of an individual or group of specific individuals, and did not 
take the necessary measures within the scope of their 
authority which could reasonably be expected to prevent or 
avoid such risk.134  
In order to decide the issues facing it, the Court examined the 
actions of the oil company that planted the explosives in and around the 
Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku’s lands and the State’s 
compliance with an earlier order to cease this conduct during the 
pendency of the case.135 Ultimately, the Court found that the State had 
placed the lives of the Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku members in 
jeopardy by allowing these actions to continue, which was a violation of 
the Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku’s right to life along with other 
property rights.136 
5.  Prison Inmates as Victims 
The Court’s jurisprudence on prison inmates is rather thin; 
nevertheless it does establish that there is higher burden on the State to 
protect those who are incarcerated because the State has assumed the 
role of guarantor for their safety and survival.137  This includes adducing 
a state requirement to protect the inmate’s right to life, particularly 
where the inmate is an incarcerated child.138 As the Court stated in 
Juvenile Re-education Institute v. Paraguay: 
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[I]n the case of the right to life, when the person the State 
deprives of his or her liberty is a child . . . it has the same 
obligations it has regarding to any person, yet compounded by 
the added obligation established in Article 19 of the American 
Convention. On the one hand, it must be all the more diligent 
and responsible in its role as guarantor and must take special 
measures based on the principle of the best interests of the 
child. On the other hand, to protect a child’s life, the State 
must be particularly attentive to that child’s living conditions 
while deprived of his or her liberty, as the child’s detention or 
imprisonment does not deny the child his or her right to life or 
restrict that right.139 
C.  The Right to Life and Reparations 
 Just as the Court has established a broad and more encompassing 
definition of the right to life and its parameters, the Court has also 
established a widely encompassing standard for how to award 
reparations for victims of human rights abuses, particularly the right to 
life.  
Perhaps the standard form of reparation for any human rights 
violation takes the form of pecuniary awards.140 The Court has 
established that there is a place for awarding pecuniary damages in 
instances where the right to life has been violated because it is 
impossible to restore the life of the victims in these instances.141 In 
deciding the amount of pecuniary damages to award, the Court has 
included lost wages over the expected wage-earning life of the victim 
and other indirect financial losses.142 
When calculating pecuniary damages, the Court has taken a more 
holistic view of the potential class of award recipients, particularly with 
respect to members of indigenous communities that have a different 
familial structure.143 While the Court has required that there be a 
definitive cut-off point for awardees after a certain degree of removal 
from the victim, it has traditionally allowed local custom—including 
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practices of indigenous communities—to be used in calculating the 
damages awarded.144 This can be seen as an expansion of the 
understanding of life in the Inter-American human rights system 
because it evaluates the impact of the victim’s life in the context of her 
identity and role in a larger community, rather than a formulaic view of 
the victim’s life based solely on majoritarian community structures. 
The Court has routinely awarded non-pecuniary—or, moral—
damages as reparations in cases involving violations of the right to 
life.145 In addition to the monetary aspects of non-pecuniary damage 
awards, the Court has been creative in crafting remedies that seek to 
honor the life of the victim and to commemorate the suffering to which 
the victim was subjected. Examples of this include the use of public 
monuments commemorating the victim, especially the use of plaques 
that indicate the exact spot where the victim was either disappeared or 
murdered, and the use of video documentaries that explain and honor 
the victim’s life and work, which is often the very reason that the victim 
was targeted.146 
 IV.  LIFE AS WE KNOW IT NOW AND IN THE FUTURE 
A.  Life as We Know It Now 
From the fairly simplistic notion of a protection from the 
deprivation of an individual’s life by a state actor in the penal context, 
the right to life in the Inter-American human rights system has rapidly 
expanded in scope through the jurisprudence of the Court. As discussed 
above, the Court has increasingly used the right to life as a tool to 
address many forms of state action—or lack thereof—which has formed 
the crux of many human rights violations taken by States against 
individuals outside of the penal context. Indeed, even where the Court 
has addressed violations of the right to life in the context of prison 
inmates, it has expanded the scope of the right to life to include a State 
responsibility to guarantee the inmate’s right to life as well as associated 
protections, such as adequate housing and medical assistance.147 
As a threshold matter, the Court has provided insight on the 
responsibilities and duties of states under the concept of protecting the 
right to life by establishing both negative and positive elements for the 
right.  The negative aspect of the right requires that the State ensure that 
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individuals are not arbitrarily deprived of their lives. The positive aspect 
of the right is “that the States adopt all appropriate measures to protect 
and preserve the right to life.”148 Further, the Court has extended state 
responsibility beyond standard state actors and to the acts of local 
officials as well as quasi-state actors such as paramilitary 
organizations.149 
Both individually and collectively, these negative and positive 
aspects of the right to life have served as the guides within which the 
Court has begun to fashion the contours of the right. This is particularly 
important in terms of the positive aspect of the right to life, since this is 
the aspect that the Court often uses to justify the inclusion of non-penal 
protections, such as access to adequate food and healthcare services for 
indigenous communities.150 The ability to use this aspect of the right to 
life in a creative manner has allowed the Court to move further into the 
realm of what constitutes the essential materials for and needs of life.151  
This movement has emboldened individuals, communities and 
those who represent them, as well as the Commission, to bring 
complaints that at first might seem outside the scope of the right to life. 
It has provided room to explore the legal parameters of the right to life 
and established the right to life as a thick area of jurisprudence at the 
Court level. This was seen above by the coupling of issues relating to 
the right to life and the rights of the child within the American 
Convention and Inter-American human rights system, as the rights of 
the child jurisprudence is arguably much thinner and less nuanced.152   
The Court has recognized two forms of violent state action against 
individuals−or communities−which rise to the level of violations of the 
right to life: the use of forced disappearances and the use of extra-
judicial killings by state actors or quasi-state actors.153 These two forms 
of violation have been constant throughout the Court’s jurisprudence; 
however, over time the Court has established a near presumption that 
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forced disappearance will equate to extra-judicial killing where the fate 
of the disappeared person is unknown and the state cannot, or will not, 
provide information on this.154 Combined with Court presumptions 
regarding the occurrence of forced disappearances and extra-judicial 
killings under certain regimes, in certain States, and at certain times, 
these near-presumptions create a situation in which victims and the 
Commission have a stronger ability to adequately prove the existence of 
one or both of these crimes—even where information on individual 
cases is not readily available.  
The importance of this combination can be seen in Court cases 
stating that forced disappearances are violations of the right to life 
because there is no evidence to support the fact that the disappeared 
person might still be alive.155 This combination is also important in the 
sphere of extra-judicial killings because these acts have historically 
been carried out by unknown state actors or quasi-state actors, thus 
raising the possibility that the victim’s representatives would be unable 
to make the causal connection to the state that is needed to effectively 
assert state responsibility and find justice for the murdered 
individual(s).156 
Of particular jurisprudential importance is that the right to life, 
according to the Court, does not end with the life of the victim himself. 
The Court has established that the right to life continues to be violated 
when the remains of victims of forced disappearance and subsequent 
extra-judicial killings are intentionally hidden from society—and 
particularly from the victim’s family—for any period of time.157 
Stressing the importance of this ongoing violation, in these situations, 
the Court has routinely ordered the implicated State to locate and return 
the remains of disappeared persons to their families, thereby preserving 
the dignity of the victim and his life.158  
In the context of extra-judicial killings, the Court has created three 
phases in which the right to life can be violated: 1) the phase in which 
the murder is planned; 2) the phase in which the murder is carried out; 
and 3) the phase in which the implicated state actors or quasi-state 
actors attempt to cover-up the murder.159 Thus, the right to life can 
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continue to be violated after the murder of the individual when the 
subsequent acts form a nexus with the murder. 
Throughout its jurisprudence, the Court has expanded the 
parameters of the right to life in relationship to particularly vulnerable 
groups within society, particularly children, women, and indigenous 
communities.160  The Court has mirrored its phases of right to life 
violations in the extra-judicial killing context where women and girls 
have been subject to sustained disappearance and murder by non-state 
actors because the state was found not to have acted effectively at the 
time that the victims were reported missing, during the investigation 
into their deaths, and in the prosecution of those who allegedly 
committed crimes against the victims. Each of these phases was 
implicated as a separate violation of the right to life.161   
Children have been identified as being particularly vulnerable to 
state actions overall and particularly to actions that effect their lives.162  
In this way, the Court has expanded the concept of the right to life to 
take into account the vulnerability of, and need to respect, the lives of 
children as well as the simple need to preserve their lives against 
arbitrary punishment.163 Further, children have been acknowledged as 
suffering right to life violations where they were abducted from their 
families as part of a concerted campaign to remove the children of 
“subversives” from their parents.164 Although some of these children 
have been located and reunited with their family members, complaints 
regarding those who have not yet been found have generated violations 
of the right to life based on the already established connection between 
forced disappearance and death.165  The Court has also allowed a found 
abducted child to bring a complaint regarding the fate of her mother as a 
violation of the mother’s right to life which, this article asserts, is a 
validation of the life of the child as part of the family from which she 
was abducted.166 
Perhaps the most innovative area of the Court’s right to life 
jurisprudence involves the duties and responsibilities that a State owes 
to indigenous communities located within its territory. Certainly, the 
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Court’s jurisprudence and expanded parameters regarding forced 
disappearances and extra-judicial killings are applicable to these 
communities due to the many acts of violence which have been 
committed against members of these communities by state or quasi-state 
actors.167 What is more novel, however, is the way in which the Court 
has established the rights that indigenous communities possess as part 
of the bundle of rights that fall within the ambit of the right to life 
overall.  
Some observers have explained the development of the rights that 
compose this bundle—and the attendant duties and responsibilities 
owed by the State—as the Court incorporating economic, social and 
cultural rights into the right to life.168 This conclusion is understandable 
and notable; nevertheless, it does not fully reflect the impact of the 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area because it seeks to create a dichotomy 
between the rights that are in this bundle, namely between those that are 
civil and political, and those that are economic, social, and cultural.169  
Rather than as a dichotomy, it is better to understand the Court’s 
jurisprudence as a cohesive acceptance of the rights, duties, and 
responsibilities surrounding indigenous communities. This underscores 
the interconnectedness of all of these rights, duties, and responsibilities 
in the same way that the community functions as a societal unit. Seen 
this way, each right is recognizable as a thread in the tapestry that is the 
right to life. Just as the loss of a thread will unravel a tapestry, so too 
will the enjoyment of the right to life unravel when one of its threads is 
broken.  
For example, the Court has recognized that the right to life 
includes the right to a decent existence, which includes State 
recognition of individual dignity.   Thus far, the Court has found that 
this right includes the right to health—encompassing the ability to 
physically access healthcare services—the right to food, and the right of 
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access to clean water.170 The Court has also made direct links between 
the right to life and the rights to education and cultural identity.171 These 
are all elements that allow the community to exist and flourish 
alongside protections against physical violence and forced 
disappearance.  
In its latest piece of jurisprudence regarding indigenous 
communities, the Court established that the right to life includes 
protection from State and private action, done with the permission of 
the State, which results in harm to an indigenous community.172  
Specifically, the Court looked at the harm that resulted from the use of 
explosives for land clearing when the State had knowledge of the 
dangers to the community and failed to protect against them.173 By 
expanding the articulated parameters of the right to life under the 
American Convention, the Court recognized the potential damages to 
the entire community—physically and economically—that stemmed 
from these measures.174 Again, the tapestry is unraveling because of 
pulled threads. 
B.  Pending Cases and Future Jurisprudence 
In recent years, the Commission has submitted a number of cases 
to the Court that arguably present the Court with opportunities to further 
refine the parameters of the right to life under the American 
Convention. Given the evolution of the right to life as charted in this 
article, it is important to examine these new cases in order to understand 
where the next contours of the right to life might be developed. 
Some cases raise issues of forced disappearance and extra-judicial 
killings that are sadly similar to the facts of many of the Court’s 
previous cases.175 Maria Isabel Veliz Franco v. Guatemala presents a 
situation factually similar to the Cotton Field case from Mexico. It 
involves the disappearance and murder of a girl in an area of Guatemala 
where there is an alleged pattern of violence against women and a 
culture of impunity as a result.176 Veliz Franco presented the Court with 
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the opportunity to further enunciate the right to life as it applies to 
women and girls in the face of the failure of the Cotton Field decision. 
In Veliz Franco, the Court could set a meaningful precedent by 
condemning the violence and discrimination against women and girls 
either in Mexico—the state implicated in the Cotton Field decision—or 
other states within the Inter-American human rights system.177  It could 
also have resulted in the Court re-addressing the role of systematic 
tolerance of violations of the right to life, allowing future violations to 
occur.  
In Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez et al (Chavin de Huántar 
Operation) v. Peru, the Court was asked to examine a case of extra-
judicial killing.178 This killing involved a terrorist group widely 
recognized as a state threat by the state military forces, in the aftermath 
of a military operation to free hostages taken by members of the 
group.179 The deceased was one of the hostages taken.180 Many novel 
legal issues are presented in Cruz Sanchez, and the balancing of the 
right to life with state interests in security, and indeed the interests of 
those who were being held hostage by the deceased, ranks highly 
among them.  
A number of cases referred by the Commission relate to massacres 
by state actors or quasi-state actors. These cases present the Court the 
opportunity to create quasi-presumptions regarding the political and 
military climate existing in the implicated States during specific 
periods. In Nadege Dorzama et al, Massacre of Guayubin v. Dominican 
Republic, the Commission referred a complaint alleging that Haitian 
state actors used excessive force against the Haitian claimants because 
of their Haitian identity.181 This case will require the Court to address 
assertions regarding the use of force and the right to life as well as, 
arguably, the connection between the right to life and violent state 
actions that are targeted against a particular nationality and ethnic 
group.182  
Some of these cases relate to massacres of populations in areas that 
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the State targeted because they were near suspected anti-government 
force strongholds.183  
Other cases relate to specific targeting of certain indigenous 
community groups—especially women and childrenfor forced 
disappearance, grotesque torture, and extra-judicial killings, largely due 
to allegations that these communities in some way had ties to anti-
government groups.184 The Court will be called upon to address these 
massacres under its already-established right to life jurisprudence, and 
again will have to examine the issue of State attempts to secure the 
population against militant groups and the legitimacy of these claims.  
Additionally, in Community of Rio Negro of the Maya Achi People 
and Its Members v. Guatemala, the Court will address the 
Commission’s assertions that Guatemala’s violations of the right to life 
against community members were so egregious and targeted toward the 
decimation of the particular community that they rose to the level of 
genocide.185 This determination will doubtless provide new contours to 
the right to life under the American Convention regardless of the 
Court’s decision. On the one hand, a finding that genocide did indeed 
occur will vastly expand the boundaries of the right to life within the 
Inter-American human rights system. On the other hand, a finding that 
the acts did not rise to the level of genocide will ensure that the right to 
life within the Inter-American human rights system will remain 
relatively static within the face of grave massacres. Either way, the right 
to life, and the Inter-American human rights system generally, will be 
impacted in a meaningful way. 
While it is impossible to predict the Court’s decisions in any of 
these pending cases, they all represent important opportunities for the 
Court to solidify, reinforce, and expand its right to life jurisprudence. 
Although the content of the Court’s future jurisprudence is unknown, it 
is certain that this jurisprudence will further the understanding of the 
right to life as we know it.  
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V.   CONCLUSION 
Throughout its history, the Court has steadily developed 
jurisprudence in connection with the right to life. This development has 
resulted in the Court fashioning an understanding of the right to life that 
is protective and inclusive, going beyond protections in the penal 
context to afford protections to those who are frequently victimized 
within the State and regarded as voiceless within society. In so doing, 
the Court has provided a vision of the right to life that is uniquely 
holistic and can be developed in the future in order to validate the many 
facets of life. Thus, the Court, in expanding the jurisprudence relating to 
and boundaries of the right to life, has given us the current 
understanding of life as we know it, and has highlighted the evolving 
nature of the right to life as an inclusive and comprehensive tool. 
 
 
